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The EU’s new Raw Materials Initiative (RMI), aims to increase Europe’s access to raw
materials in developing countries, while at the same time increasing development in those
countries. Benjamin Laag argues that it remains to be seen whether the RMI can actually
improve EU’s access to raw materials, and that it may also not provide the benefits it intends
to in developing countries.
Europe’s economy is highly dependent on the import of raw materials. According to the
European Commission’s report of critical raw materials for the EU, this dependency does not
primarily result from a physical scarcity of commodities but from new geopolitical challenges,
supply risks and rising commodity demands from emerging economies. For example, China’s strategic
export restriction on rare earthand its resolute quest for resources in Africa defy European commodity
interests. Many resource-rich developing countries possess raw materials vital for Europe’s economy.
Consequently, the EU’s Raw Materials Initiative (RMI)addresses this high import-dependence and foresees a
“relevant role” for EU development cooperation to accommodate Europe’s need for “undistorted access to
raw materials” in developing countries.
However, the contribution from EU development policy that is envisioned by the RMI may not necessarily
correspond with its objectives (e.g., poverty alleviation), since the development of the resource wealth of
many developing countries does not automatically lead to broader development. Instead, several resource-
rich countries, for instance, the Democratic Republic of Congo, are plagued by a multi-faceted “resource
curse” that can be referred to as the following asymmetric principal-agent problem:
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The first principal is constituted by the citizens of a
country virtually owning the natural resources within its
national borders. As an agent of this principal the
developing country government is to administer these
resources for the benefit of its citizens. The second
principal consists of the stakeholders of an extractive
cooperation who want its managers or agents to secure
as much profit as possible. As we know, agents are
bound by the preferences of their principals while also
pursuing their own self-interest. In order to ensure an
economically viable extraction of natural resources, the
stakeholders of a company link the manager’s salary to
the profits of the company. Usually, the highest good of a
government is legitimacy by its principal resulting from
providing public goods and being responsive to the
people’s demands. Thus, legitimacy requires some
degree of taxation (to provide for public goods) and
representation (to channel people’s demands).
The strength of these incentives (profit and legitimacy) is
put to a test when the agents (extractive cooperation and
government) start interacting on behalf of their principals.
If negotiating with extractive industries is financially
beneficial for governments (granting property rights and
security in return for royalties, fees, and also bribes), the
feedback loop from the government to its people is
severely weakened. Excessive resource revenues or
“rents” (making taxation obsolete) in combination with
feeble government accountability create an asymmetric
agency problem that finally prevents countries from translating their resource wealth into economic
development or pro-poor growth.
In a nutshell: Europe’s urgent need for other countries’ raw materials constitutes a passable foreign policy
interest. Nevertheless, as the RMI states, “meeting our critical needs for growth and jobs in Europe” does not
inevitably bring about the expected benefits for commodity-exporting countries that are pursued by EU
development policy.
In order to ensure a “sustainable supply of non-energy raw materials for the EU” the RMI builds on three
pillars. The third (reduction of the EU’s consumption of primary raw materials) and the second pillar (fostering
sustainable supply of raw materials from European sources) have internal perspectives on policies and
behaviour within the EU. The first pillar is about “access to raw materials on world markets at undistorted
conditions” and prescribes a European “raw materials diplomacy” with specific demands for development
policy. These demands include development action at three different levels: strengthening states, promoting a
sound investment climate, and promoting sustainable management of raw materials. Consequently:
the 10th European Development Fund has allocated € 2.7 billion for good governance programmes
(strengthening states);
the European Investment Bank supports mining projects in Africa with an average annual amount of €
140 million through the EU-Africa Infrastructure Fund (sustainable management of raw materials); and
the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) receives funding from the EU in order to
increase the transparency of government revenues (taxes, profits, royalties) generated by extractive
industries (promoting a sound investment climate).
While the European Commission speaks of a win-win situation for European industries and resource-rich
developing countries, it is important to recognise the shift from policy coherence for development to
“coherence between EU development policy and the EU’s need for undistorted access to raw materials”. This
shift also echoes in the critique of many NGOs who complain about European raw materials diplomacy: It is
not based on development objectives but driven by competition with USA and China. Also, considering
developing countries mainly as exporters of raw materials is too narrow. For example, a sound investment
climate could generate revenues from resource extraction necessary to develop local downstream industries.
But without corresponding regulations governing natural resource extraction, more openness to FDI could
also overburden the capacity of local tax regimes or accelerate unsustainable resource patterns at the same
time.
Only partially addressing these concerns, the RMI has been complemented by the communication “Tackling
the Challenges in Commodity Markets and on Raw Materials” which devotes two pages to the coherence
between supply of raw materials and development policy. Stronger emphasis is put on enhancing governance
and transparency to achieve “inclusive growth and sustainable development in resource rich countries”. The
Commission proposes country-by-country reporting in order to gather more precise information of how to
“enhance capacity for using revenues to support development objectives”. Based on the RMI and together
with the African Union Commission’s policy on mining and minerals, the African Mining Vision has been
developed in 2009 to increase cooperation in governance, investment and geological knowledge. Best
practises are to be shared with the African Development Bank, and the application of EU standards by
European extractive industries in developing countries is to be promoted.
Taken as a whole, this recent communication broadens what could have been a rather narrow RMI.
Nonetheless, it remains to be seen whether the RMI can improve EU’s access to raw materials in developing
countries and how this strategy relates to other policy objectives. In other words: how can European resource
policy coherently reconcile interest and values?
Please read our comments policy before commenting.
Note:  This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and
Policy, nor of the London School of Economics.
Shortened URL for this post: http://bit.ly/M5xhRa
_______________________________
About the author
Benjamin Laag – Münster University
Benjamin Laag is a PhD candidate at the Graduate School of Politics at Münster University
and a doctoral fellow of Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung. He holds an MSc from Twente University
and an MA from Münster University in European Studies, and an undergraduate degree in
Public Administration. His doctoral thesis focuses on the role of policy coherence in European
and German resource policy.
No related posts.
